ABSTRACT
model that broadly describes the patterns in the IT-industry from 1952 to 2007 so they can be explained and the implications of their continuation can be examined.
THE INFORMATION AGE (1952-Present)
The first commercial computers were introduced in the early 1950s, could fill an average home (the computer on one floor and the cooling system on the other), cost over $1 million in the currency of the day, used vacuum tubes, and had what for that time was an astounding 14K of ram. Since then, the role and power of commercial computers has so expanded that modern society calls the current period The Information Age and sees it as the successor age to The Industrial Age (1700-1950).
The first 50 years of the Information Age can be separated into the Hardware and Software Micro-ages (respectively, 1952-1982 and 1982-2002) . The IT-market crash of 2000-02 suggests that the IT-industry is responding neither well nor quickly enough to the dawning of a new micro-age within The Information Age. The coming Wetware Micro-age will foster the dominance of firms with (or able to develop) a user-cost focus and profoundly affect information markets and practises.
The Hardware Micro-Age (1952-1982)
Computer hardware ushered in The Information Age (around 1952) by become sufficiently reliable and cost effective for common use by large corporations. Since then, hardware has become ever smaller, more reliable, and more cost-effective. This progression is apparent in the sequence of quotes in Appendix 1 and the analysis of that sequence in Appendix 2. The observation that today's calculator watches have more power than the mainframes of the mid -20 th Century is illustrative of the progress in computer hardware.
This progression of computer power has, for nearly half-a-century, been epitomized by Gordon Moore (1965) in what is now the famous Moore's Law: transistor density (i.e. computer power) doubles every two years (Economist, 10 May 2003, p.3) and its corollary: costs fall by half -i.e. the chip cost remains constant (Harrow, 2002) . The original Moore's Law used 18 months as the doubling time, the modified form (two year doubling period) is examined because it is considered to be broadly more accurate over the 50 years being reviewed (Economist, 10 May 2003, p.3). The first part of Moore's law caricaturizes the computer-power progression as: Ç = 2 . 5(t-1952) (1) Ç = Computer power in units; 1 unit is broadly and arbitrarily set at the power of a 1952 mainframe 1952 = is the starting point of the hardware micro-age t = the year, t ≥ 1952
The second part of Moore's Law caricaturized the progression in hardware costs as: Estimating computer power over the 55 year span of The Information Age is difficult, especially given how input/output devices have evolved over the years. For example, how do we measure the effect of shifting from bread-board wire-programming to punch tape/cards, to keyboards/monitors, and the current movement toward voice-based input/output -these shifts reduced mean computer access-time from monthly, to less than 24 hours, to minutes, to seconds, and so forth. The addition of math co-processors in the 1970s and the recent shift to dual processors, further complicate the analysis. The importance of Moore's Law rests not in its detail of transistors or specifics of technology, but in the broad magnificent sweep of its meaning that human-calculating power doubles each N-years. This idea is captured in the following figure. Gordon Moore recently provided a mixed message when he hedged Moore's Law by asserting that -The doubling will slow down …You really get bit by the fact that the materials are made of atoms‖ and then (in counterpoint) expressed his confidence that -…designers will come up with a way to have multibillion-transistor budgets‖ (Harrow, 2002; Dubash, 2005 ).
There is a common expectation that Moore's Law must fail sooner or later. However, as Chen (2003, p.16) asserts: -No exponential is forever …but we can delay forever‖. While delay forever is hyperbole, any good tax accountant will confirm that many deferrals can be extended so far into the distant future that forever, for all practical purposes, is not wrong. Tuomi (2003) , to support his assertion that nearly five decades of exponential growth in computing power (Moore's Law) is only a temporary aberration, used a compost of trivial details of current technology. Tuomi (2003) cautions against Moore's Law by asserting: -True innovation is not predicable‖. This caution, while correct, is not particularly relevant -those who work with learning/ technology curves know that trends in innovation can be reasonably predicted, but undue reliance on predicted timing is almost as risky as not considering the cost-reducing effects of the processes such curves represent. Thus, to successfully invalidate a purported trend like Moore's Law, one must show that history does not sustain it, or (if it has been valid over a reasonable period) there is now a significant departure from the trend, or that an underlying cause of the trend either has changed or there is reasonable expectation that it will change (within a relevant period). Figure 1 shows that, far from needing hedging, Moore's Law is too conservative. Specifically, if the semilog (10) of the rise in calculation power in Figure 1 was linear, it would validate Moore's Law; a concave (to the Xaxis) curvilinear curve would indicate that Moore's Law is too optimistic; the actual convex (to the X-axis) curve indicates that Moore's Law is far too conservative and supports Kurzweil's (2001, p.9) assertion that calculation power accelerates at an accelerating rate.
The rate of increase in acceleration is called Jerk and the idea is often used by engineers seeking to smooth the start-up of an elevator. Thus, Kurzweil's assertion that calculation power accelerates at an accelerating rate can be made more specific by renaming it Kurzweil's Constant Jerk (i.e. the acceleration of the acceleration of calculation power is constant). This idea can be tested by logging the semi-log data in Figure 1 . Kurzweil's research team kindly provide the that data they used to create Figure 1 -a quick audit of that data confirmed its mathematical integrity, that the costs had been correctly indexed to 1998 $US, and showed that it fairly represents a broad crosssection of a progression of 20 th Century calculating machines and computers. The curve in Figure 1 logged data was straightened by double logging the data to evaluate the Jerk.
However, because the log of a value ≤ nil is undefined, the data was scaled up from computations/ second/1,000 [$US]‖ to those per $ billion $US. As this adjustment is a placeholder shift and the analysis looks at rates of change, the adjustment does not adversely affect the analysis. Equation (5) While the Jerk (i.e. the rate of increase in the acceleration) of calculating power is decreasing over time (i.e. the curve is concave to the X-axis), it is decreasing toward a constant Jerk. Thus, Kurzweil's Constant Jerk of calculation power becomes increasingly valid, after 1950, until at the limit (t) it is completely correct-it can be represented by the first term in eqn (5), to give:
While Wright's Jerk Correction (eqn (5a)) is valid for 1900-1997 and, via extrapolation, on to the limit (as t), the correction from eqn (6) (5), (5a) and (6) are very complex and difficult to understand. However, their ideas can be visually represented in terms of their effect on the doubling time of calculation power. Moore's Law asserts a constant doubling rate of every two years (i.e. per eqn (2), (e .34657 ) 2 = 2.0). The doubling time for eqn (6)-Kurzweil's assertion-is estimated with:
Given that the estimate of N for Wright's Jerk Correction is a relation, but not a function (i.e. N is on both sides of the relation), N must be found iteratively. Figure 3 shows the effect on calculation-power doubling time of Moore's Law, Kurzweil's Constant Jerk and Wright's Correction. Wright's Correction adjusts for the reality that doubling calculation power is easy when the power is very low but becomes increasingly more difficult as the power increases. Moore's Law (Co n st a n t Acce le ra t io n )
Kurzweil's Cons tant Jerk (Co n st a n t Acce le ra t io n o f Acce le ra t io n )
Wright's Correction (Je r k De ce le ra t in g t o a Co n st a n t )
Thus, the doubling time rises (i.e. a declining Jerk) early in the 20 th Century until the offsetting effect of rising technological power reverses the trend after 1929 and Wright's Correction becomes ever more congruent with Kurzweil's Constant Jerk -the two become indistinguishable soon after the middle of the 20 th Century.
The shape of Wright's Jerk Correction between 1896 and 1906 may be an artefact of the equation form and/or the iterative technique used to calculate the doubling period -these results should not be trusted until more detailed studies are completed.
It is clear from Figure 3 
2.1.2
Hardware Costs (1952-2010)
The transpose of eqn (6) (Kurzweil's Constant Jerk, in Figure 2 ) provides a good estimate of the pattern of decline in computer costs during The Information Age. However, the calibration of this trend has important implications for the model. Specifically, if it is calibrated to a recent point in the period (e.g. 2008), costs at the start of the period become meaninglessly large, but if it is calibrated to an early point in the period, the costs rapidly become meaninglessly small. As a compromise, the calibration is done using the cost and power of 100 IBM PC- 
The hardware-cost curve, in Figure 4 , shows that hardware costs have declined and continue to decline at an amazing rate. However, cost declines in the other IT roles (i.e. Software and Wetware) have failed to keep pace with those in Hardware. This imbalance in cost-reduction success has real consequences for the Hardware manufactures-the relative cost of hardware dropped so low that the costs of the other IT roles now dominate the decision to acquire, replace, update or maintain IT systems. Thus, the unparalleled cost-reduction success in hardware has made hardware costs, more or less, irrelevant in the decision to acquire or upgrade an IT system.
The Software Micro-Age (1982-2002)
The raw calculating power and storage of hardware is meaningless without software to give users access, indexing, manipulation, analysis, communication, etc.
Early in The Information Age, programmers punched machine code on paper tape or cards to directly instruct CPUs (computer central processing units). This laborious, exacting process (e.g. it is like using pixels to form letters, to be gathered into words, and then into sentences) was costly but hardware costs were so high that software costs were seen as being incidental.
Over the first few decades of The Information Age, low-level programming-functions were hard-wired into CPUs or collected into ever more powerful programming languages -this process allowed programmers to work at ever higher levels -figuratively, the programmer's task moved from programming with pixels, to letters, to word, to sentences, to paragraphs. The object-oriented approach to programming, developed over the last few decades, is similar to working with pictures -as a picture is a worth a thousand words, the jump in programming power is immense. Expanding libraries of objects, object sentences, and object paragraphs that can be accessed and combined by programmers are increasing the power of software by multiple orders of magnitude.
Based on this progression of software power, the model in this paper asserts that program costs fell very slowly at the start of The Information Age, gathered momentum shortly after software costs and the need to make software use easier became visible issues in the early 1980s, and the decline in software costs is currently losing momentum-as software gains have become ever more costly to achieve. This cost pattern can be described by: In the mid-1990s the drop in software costs appeared to almost go into a free-fall -thus, it is reasonable to assume the inflection point occurs in 1993. Setting j at 7.0 starts the visible fall in software costs in the early 1980s, when the IBM PC-type computer was introduced.
In 1982, software costs for a PC were around $3,000 with maintenance costs (e.g. upgrades) of around $450 a year. Assuming eight years of useful life for upgradeable software and an 18 percent interest rate, the average 
In Figure 4 , after the mid-1980s, software costs increasingly overshadow hardware costs in IT-system decisions and both hardware and software costs decline exponentially. By the mid-1990s, almost everyone in ITmarkets was making money and, given constant or rising demand and costs that continued falling exponentially, ITvendors (projecting form past experience) had good reason to believe their future was so bright that they needed shades. However, the IT crashes of 2000-2002 lasted so long and hit so hard, so quickly, and with so little warning that structural issues must be involved along with the usual suspects of exuberance, imprudence and fraud. As the next subsection argues, the important structural issues afflicting IT-markets in the opening decades of the 21 st Century are those of IT-Users not IT-Suppliers. IT-Suppliers, who do not cater to those needs, risk becoming irrelevant to IT acquisition decisions.
The Wetware Micro-Age (2002-20??)
Wetware refers to the IT-system user -in particular, the indirect costs of making users sufficiently knowledgeable and ready to use IT hardware and software, the cost of using the system (e.g. the time spent on input, operations, and output -user time is not a free good), and the cost of interpreting, correcting, and just making sense of the computer output. During much of The Information Age, these costs were, in relative terms, so small they were ignored or buried in other costs. However, IT-suppliers who once could safely ignore user-indirect costs (or increase them by prematurely releasing buggy/kludgy software for users to Beta-test), do so today only at extreme peril. Today's users are becoming ever less shy about demanding that their IT-systems solve more problems than they create and leading-edge systems are increasingly seen as bleeding-edge systems -i.e. users bleed time and money to little or no advantage. Wetware costs are assumed to equal, in 2000, the combined hardware and software costs ($59,600) -if that value is substituted into the LHS of eqn (11) for the year 2000, eqn (11) can be reorganized to define parameter r as 0.1365. As illustrated in Figure 5 , Wetware costs dominate the cost of owning a computer system, in the opening years of the 21 st Century.
It is very apparent from Figure 5 that concern over rising Wetware costs likely contributed to the chill in IT acquisitions that lead to the IT-crash of 2000-2002 and that those costs are likely to continue rising and chilling ITmarkets. If Wetware costs are not quickly tamed and contained, they will increasingly dominate IT acquisition decisions. It seems likely that incentives to further reduce hardware and software costs will, eventually, be greatly chilled by the dominant-cost effect of rising wetware costs.
The Response to Wetware Costs
The increasing awareness of the importance of wetware costs means that solutions are being sought and will be found to mitigate and overcome their chilling effect on IT-markets. Just as some early software problems were resolved by hardwiring solutions into CPUs, many of the initial wetware solutions involve changes to hardware and software.
For example, plug-and-play now reduces the complications of setup and installation of new hardware even though the issues, bugs, and kludge of the early versions caused some wag to rename the process plug-and-pray. Other approaches include redesigning software to reduce and/or buffer information overload with system routine, gate-keeping functions, quasi-AI, and AI. Many new programs have self-learning nodes that reprogram features to user needs in a near-seamless way by learning from user responses. For example, MSWord XP has a feature that corrects what it thinks are user mistakes, but as the user reverse a correction, a heuristic feature reduces the likelihood of that correction being used in future similar circumstances-eventually, via such quasi-AI processes, programs learn (self-program) to better serve their user. A similar process is used by programs like SpamAssasin in learning to identify and filter spam by its content (Kajmowicz, 10 Aug. 2003 ). More and more networks are being designed around a core that evolves one step at a time in response to changes made by users -these systems adapt via the Hidden-Hand-of-User-Needs to meet the current and changing needs of users and thereby reduce the degree to which users are forced to adapt to the system. In some cases (e.g. Yahoo) a system evolves via a Delphi-like process that is far more complex, more flexible, and at a lower cost than anything that could have been designed by a team of programmers. One thing that appears to be missing in this process is the use of librarians to organize and 
THE FUTURE OF COMPUTING
While predicting the future is the domain of futurists like Kurzweil (2005) , trends that are readily apparent from this study include:

The near future belongs to IT-suppliers who can optimize the user's total-cost-of-ownership (TCO) with intuitive self-learning Delphi-like systems. This advantage will become even stronger as voice-recognition interfaces increasingly supersede keyboards, mice and menus. However, such advances (as much as they will enrich the suppliers) will only delay, not resolve, the issue of wetware costs. 
The intermediate-and long-term future is already being shaped by scientists and technicians working with neural interfaces for the physically challenged (Economist, pp.79-80, 18 October 2003) -sooner, rather than later, these interfaces will change humanity itself. Figure 5 shows why change must and will occur -if not resolved, wetware costs will stall human progress and history teaches us that human cultures that do not progress redirect their energies and/ or stagnate, until they are absorbed into a more vibrant culture or are destroyed by external and/or internal barbarians.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The shortest stave in a rain barrel sets how much water it holds. Similarly, the least cost-effective of the hardware, software, or wetware roles tend to govern activity in the IT-markets. Falling hardware costs initiated The Information Age in 1952 and hardware governed IT markets until its costs fell so low that, after the early 1980s, software concerns increasingly dominated IT-markets.
The IT-market crashes of 2000-2002 may be heralding yet another nexus in IT-markets. Just as the success of the hardware giants in increasing the power of their products, while cutting costs, created favourable conditions for dominance succession by software firms, the ongoing success in hardware and software have created such powerful, versatile, and cost-effective IT-systems that user indirect-costs (i.e. wetware costs) are increasingly becoming the dominant factor in IT-investment decisions.
Wetware costs are rising so relatively rapidly that they are chilling what, in the 1990s, was the hottest market in the economy. If the wetware-cost hurdle cannot be tamed, it may strangle The Information Age.
The first tentative steps to resolve the wetware-cost hurdle have been taken in the form of adaptive systems. In the intermediate term, our culture and businesses will evolve around resolutions to the wetware-cost problem, just as its precursor cultures adapted to writing (i.e. pre-literate and literate societies and peoples are profoundly different). The long run may prove Kurzweil -Where a calculator on the ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes and weighs 30 tons, computers in the future may have only 1,000 vacuum tubes and perhaps weigh only 1.5 tons.‖ (Attributed to a March 1949 issue of Popular Mechanics, by White, 1993, p.323).
-By 1950 the real constraints to the development of the computer were technological; thus most of the effort in the early 1950s was on hardware….It was roughly 1953 when large numbers of businesses started to purchase computers for data processing.‖ (Levin, et al., 1986 , pp.32-33).
-At first, computers were too expensive for routine business data processing and accounting. However, since 1950, the cost of computing has been cut in half approximately every three years.‖ , p.116).
-Among the business-oriented computers which were available in the early 1960's, the IBM 1401, the Honeywell 400, the RCA 301, the GE 225, the NCR 315, and the Burroughs 280 were typical examples….The speed at which these machines could accept punched cards varied from 600 to 1,000 cards per minute, and they could output printed lines (of between 100 and 132 characters per line) at the rate of 600 to 1,000 lines per minute. The internal storage capacity of these computers was…between 4,000 and 16,000 characters of internal storage [4 to 16K; and] …the rental rates ranged between $6,000 and $12,000 a month.‖ (Vance and Boutell, 1975, pp.41-42).
In -the late 1970's, .…computers were primitive by today's standards. They offered only 16 kilobytes of internal memory but nevertheless cost from $15,000 to $30,000.‖ , p.116). Per -…the Financial Post (June, 1988) a microcomputer which cost $10,000 today has more power than a $5 million mainframe built about a decade ago.‖ (Kieso, et al., 1991 . p.103).
-By the mid 1990s a small business could buy a computer with more than 100 megabytes of [internal] memory for less than $1,000. The computing power that once filled a room can now be easily carried in a briefcase. , p.116).
-The computing power of a digital watch today exceeds the computing power of the largest calculating machines just 50 years ago.‖ (McWatters, et al., 2001, p.5) .
